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INTRODUCTION
In an era of globalization fueled by the driving force of capital-
ism, corporations have been pushing for the unrestricted move-
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ment of capital and goods throughout the world.' Although this
policy has made some countries and their domestic corporations
wealthy, global promulgation of this agenda has tolled an
immense human cost.2 With the signing of free trade agreements,
corporations can more easily move factories to nations offering the
lowest cost of production.' Such ability has created an environ-
ment where corporations operating in nations with effective ave-
nues to remedy workers' rights violations are incentivized to move
production to countries that lack such protections.4 Underdevel-
oped nations looking to attract these corporations are thusly
encouraged not to enforce their labor and environmental laws. 5
Lax enforcement affords underdeveloped nations one of their few
opportunities to economically compete with developed nations and
creates intense competition amongst nations also willing to
degrade labor and environmental standards.6 Many scholars have
named this latter competition the race to the bottom and has been
highlighted as a major cause of environmental abuse as well as
abhorrent human rights violations in factories around the world.7
The race to the bottom has attracted the attention and criti-
cism of many scholars, politicians, and labor activists who have
become aware of this global economic reality as well as one of the
major methods by which it is created: free trade agreements. This
recognition has become especially noticeable in developed coun-
tries like the United States where politicians have attempted to
appease their constituency by including provisions in free trade
agreements that allegedly prevent signatories from lowering envi-
1. See LYDIA MIHELIC PULSIPHER, WORLD REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY: GLOBAL
PATTERNS, LocAL LIVEs 32 (4th ed. 2008).
2. See Morton E. Winston, Book Note, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 824 (1999) (reviewing
WILLIAM H. MEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THIRD
WORLD NATIONS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, FOREIGN AID, AND REPRESSION
(1998)).
3. See generally Lance Compa, Labor Rights and Labor Standards in
International Trade, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 165 (1993).
4. See generally Sherri M. Durand, American Maquiladoras: Are They Exploiting
Mexico's Working Poor?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 128 (1994).
5. Bradley S. Fiorito, Calling A Lemon a Lemon: Regulating Electronic Gambling
Machines to Contain Pathological Gambling, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (2006);
Chris Wold, Evaluating NAFTA and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation:
Lessons for Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade Agreements, 28 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 201, 223 (2008).
6. See generally Gareth Porter, Trade Competition and Pollution Standards:
"Race to the Bottom" or "Stuck at the Bottom," 8 J. ENV'T. & DEV. 133 (1999).
7. Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3 INT'L STUDIES
REV. 53 (2001).
8. See infra Part II.
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ronmental and labor standards (which US voters assert result in a
loss of American jobs).9 Despite inclusion of these provisions, the
constraints tend to be purposefully ineffective and a race to the
bottom is not avoided. 10 This undoubtedly occurs because of the
incentive structure of the sovereigns entering into free trade
agreements, which is frequently between economically developed
and underdeveloped countries." Under free trade, underdeveloped
countries have an incentive to create a comparative advantage by
exploiting their country's labor force, while the developed country
and their corporations have an incentive to allow such exploita-
tion. 2 As a result, provisions in free trade agreements meant to
protect labor and the environment often have a negligible impact
and permit governments to degrade or ignore labor and environ-
mental laws.' 3 Such a transnational trade structure permits North
American corporations unfettered discretion as to the extent they
wish to impose abhorrent labor conditions or destroy a country's
environment for economic gain."'
In Mexico, surrendering the choice to corporations as to the
extent they respect human rights and the environment has
resulted in an unfortunate reality. Mexican workers are allowed
to labor in 19th century sweatshop like conditions, and at times,
children accompany their parents to work." Women in particular
are faced with horrid conditions. 6 Many have been forced to work
late in their pregnancy resulting in miscarriages due to stressful
work environments. 7 As unfortunate as these realities may be,
9. Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J.
931, 1019 (1997).
10. See infra Part II.
11. See Sayim Yorgun, Illegal Mobilization of Labour: The Effects of Illegal
Migration and Unauthorized Foreign Workers on the Turkish Labour Market (1998),
http://www.sayimyorgun.com/article3.html. This paper was presented at the IIRA 5th
Asian Regional Congress, "Dynamics and Diversity: Employment Relations in the
Asian-Pacific Region," which took place in Seoul on June 23-26, 2004.
12. Anwar Shaikh, Globalization and the Myth of Free Trade, NEW SCH. U., 10
(Apr. 5, 2003), http://causaestudiantil.com.ar/bibliotecavirtual/BIBLIOTECA
%20DEL%20PENSAMIENTO/SHAIKH%20ANWAR%20-%20GLOBALIZATION%20
AND%20THE%20MYTH%200F%20FREE%20TRADE.pdf. Developed nations have
an incentive to allow the country with whom they are entering into a free agreement
to participate in the race to the bottom because it allows the developed country's
corporations to increase their profits and provide cheaper products to domestic
consumers.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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they are just a few of the human rights violations that have been
perpetuated in Mexico. 18 These workers' inadequate compensation
forces many to live below the poverty line while simultaneously
being exposed to dangerous toxins. 9 Exposure to toxins not only
occurs in factories using dangerous solvents and chemicals, but
also around the factories where the workers live. 2° Because there
are few constraints on how corporations dispense of pollution,
toxic waste is often discarded in residential areas around the fac-
tories.21 Such dumping areas become cesspools for communicable
disease, and the rates of cancer in communities around the facto-
ries are much greater than others. 22 These are the realities of cor-
porate factories unhindered by governmental regulations, and
they are immensely harmful to Mexicans. Such dreadful condi-
tions are the very reality this article attempts to combat. The
attempt at this lofty goal is undertaken by analyzing how these
conditions are created under free trade, and then analyzing the
complex legal landscape of the Alien Tort Statue in attempt to dis-
cover a potential disincentive against corporate abuses in such
economic paradigm.
NAFTA is one of the first and most prominent examples of a
free trade agreement that was draped with toothless labor and
environmental constraints in addition to perpetuating a race to
the bottom. Part I of this article focuses on the effect the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has had on Mexico's
labor force, as well as how the NAFTA side agreements on labor
and the environment have failed to prevent Mexico from degrad-
ing its laws.23 The article will show that the race to the bottom
under NAFTA has resulted in a decay of living conditions and
workers' rights in and around foreign owned Mexican factories.
These conditions are explored in an effort to show how free trade
agreements with no constraining labor and environmental provi-
sions allow corporations to abuse a nation's populace.
After illuminating these realities, a question of immeasurable
import arises: is there a solution to these human rights failings?
18. See infra Part II.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor
and the Environment, 26 Loy. L.A. IN'L & CoMP. L. REV. 359, 378 (2004); Monica
Schurtman, Los "Jonkeados" and the NAALC: the Autotrim /Customtrim Case and its
Implications for Submissions under the NAFTA Side Agreement, 22 ARiz. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 291, 378 (2005).
446
ACHILLES' HEEL
The difficulty in answering such question is intensified by the
effects of the global competition to the race to the bottom. Any
solution, absent overthrowing governments, must take into con-
sideration that governments do not want to create a disincentive
for corporations to do business in their country.24 As a result, eco-
nomic impediments to corporations (such as enforcement of labor
laws) may be ill-perceived by underdeveloped nations and there-
fore are not realistic solutions. 5 A solution must therefore be
applicable not only to the particular nation racing to the bottom,
but to all nations in such competition. Fortunately, a complex yet
realistic answer may lie in the Alien Tort Statute.
Part III of this article offers the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a
solution to abate human rights abuses in Mexican factories. If
navigated correctly, the statute may allow Mexican workers to
bring claims against US corporations for violations of their human
rights. This remedy is particularly suitable to combat corporate
abuse because it is immune from the opposing pressure to allow
human rights violations under the race to the bottom. The statute
is applicable to all aliens of the United States, and therefore its
application will put no nation in the race to the bottom at a disad-
vantage. Examination of the ATS as applied to Mexican workers is
especially relevant in light of outdated and inaccurate aspects of
current scholarship that suggest a claim would not succeed.26 With
the revaluation of scholarship and the potential of the statute
fully understood, this article will offer the ATS not only as a tool to
make free trade agreements and therefore market capitalism in
Mexico more responsive to workers' rights, but as a solution to
remedy abuses around the globe.
PART I: ANALYSIS OF NAFTA AND ITS SIDE AGREEMENTS
An Overview of NAFTA
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting promi-
nence of market capitalism on the world stage, the United States
was poised to expand its capitalistic agenda throughout the Amer-
icas.2" The United States has carried out this goal by signing free
24. Laura Spitz, The Gift of Enron: An Opportunity to Talk about Capitalism,
Equality, Globalization, and the Promise of a North-American Charter of
Fundamental Rights, 66 OHIo ST. L.J. 315, 396 (2005).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See generally Ricardo Grinspun & Robert Kreklewich, Consolidating
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trade agreements with other nations.2 NAFTA is one of the first
and most historic of these regional trade agreements. 9 The agree-
ment was passed in an effort to facilitate the unhindered move-
ment of capital and goods among the three countries, creating a
new economic model in North America."
The negotiators of NAFTA accomplished a variety of economic
goals meant to benefit its signatories. The agreement required
each country to phase out many types of tariffs and subsidies, eco-
nomic impediments that are harmful to the signatories' corpora-
tions." Impediments such as import licenses that had previously
excluded American goods from Canadian and Mexican markets
were accordingly lifted.2 In addition to facilitating the movement
of corporate products, the countries also attempted to incentivize
transnational investment by strengthening corporate rights.
NAFTA ensures that corporations can carry out transnational
investment among the three countries with less risk of expropria-
tion or governmental measures meant to protect domestic corpora-
tions. 4 It accomplishes this latter goal by affording corporations in
any of the three signatories the ability to do business without sig-
natories providing domestic corporations with an unfair advan-
tage. 5 To ensure these rights are upheld, corporations who assert
a violation of NAFTA are provided with a neutral arbitral tribunal
holding the power to award damages against the accused govern-
ment. 6 It was believed this trade model would fundamentally
Neoliberal Reforms: "Free Trade" as a Conditioning Framework, 43 STUD. POL. ECON.
34 (1994).
28. Id.
29. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (2000).
30. See supra Part I.
31. Tariffs artificially increase the price of products produced by a foreign
company, putting them at a disadvantage with respect to domestic non-tariffed
companies. Subsidies from the government to domestic businesses decrease the final
cost of a product and artificially make such product less expensive than foreign
produced non-subsidized goods.
32. Kent S. Foster & Dean C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Agricultural Sector, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 985, 994 (1994).
33. As Article 1102 of NAFTA states, "Each Party shall accord to investors of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances,
to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." While
Article 1110 asserts, "No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate
an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment."
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. As Article 1115 of NAFTA states,"... this Section establishes a mechanism for
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change the way North America did business, and to some extent,
it would. 7 Many pontificated that the changes would create a
more efficient market among the three countries from which
North America would benefit.38 However, the fundamental way
the new model would alter trade and change the way North
America did business went far beyond transnational investment
or efficiency. Despite resulting economic gains, the greatest
changes would come in the form of human rights violations. 9
The reality of such cost was foreseeable, and the US
attempted to address the concern about Mexico's potential race to
the bottom.40 It was predicted that after the ratification of NAFTA
Mexico would not enforce its labor and environmental laws per-
mitting corporations to exploit its environment and labor force.4'
Clearly such an act would give Mexico a competitive advantage
under NAFTA, and absent a race to the bottom, would benefit sub-
stantially less from the agreement. 4' As a result, two side agree-
ments addressing labor and the environment were passed: the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion (NAALC).43 These side agreements were meant to prevent
Mexico from lowering environmental and labor rights protections
in an effort to become more competitive." Unfortunately, the hope
that these agreements would create positive change quickly faded
to the realization that the two agreements proved ineffective, and
that Mexico had every intention of allowing corporations to perpe-
trate human rights violations for a greater profit.45
the settlement of investment disputes that assures [] equal treatment among
investors of the Parties ......
37. See David M. Gould, Has NAFTA Changed North American Trade?, EcoN.
REV. 12 (1998), http://www.dallasfed.com/research / er /1998!er9801b.pdf.
38. See Dr. Joseph McKinney, NAFTA Turns Ten, BAYLOR Bus. REV. (2004), http:l!
www.baylor.edu/bbr/index.php?id=16167.
39. See infra Part II.
40. Cody Jacobs, Trade We Can Believe In: Renegotiating NAFTA's Labor
Provisions to Create More Equitable Growth in North America, 17 GEo. J. POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 127, 129 (2010).
41. John P. Isa, Testing the NAALC's Dispute Resolution System: A Case Study, 7
Am. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 179, 184 (1999).
42. Id.
43. Knox, supra note 24, at 363-64.
44. Id.
45. Isa, supra note 42, at 213; Schurtman, supra note 24, at 295; Knox, supra note
24, at 378.
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North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) was meant to prevent Mexico from its anticipated race
to the bottom, but it failed to accomplish this purpose.46 In large
part, the reason the United Slates asserted an interest in prevent-
ing the degradation of labor standards in Mexico was to appease
labor organizations such as the AFL-CIO, whose placation was
assumedly needed to pass NAFTA in the United States Con-
gress.47 Indeed, both Mexico and the United States would benefit
economically from the weak enforcement of Mexican labor laws.
Whereas the United States economy benefits by allowing corpora-
tions to receive a greater return on investments because of lower
labor costs, the Mexican government benefits from greater foreign
direct investment and proportionally higher taxes. As a result,
due to the agreement being a ploy to appease political constituen-
cies and the overall incentive structure of NAFTA, the NAALC is
ineffective at protecting worker's rights.48
The side agreement on labor establishes an ineffective mecha-
nism where both public and private actors can air grievances with
respect to a certain defined class of labor abuses. 9 The agreement
requires a country to enforce its current labor laws. ° However,
most cases brought under the side agreement create soft law,
which means the violating government or corporation is not
legally obligated to abide by a ruling made pursuant to the agree-
ment.51 Worse yet, the parties charged with the ability to deter-
mine whether claims will have a hard law effect are NAFTA's
signatories.52 This is much like the fox guarding the henhouse, as
each country has an incentive to ignore labor abuses in order to
collectively reap greater economic gains. According to Human
46. Vivian H.W. Wang, Investor Protection or Environmental Protection? "Green"
Development under CAFTA, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 256 (2007); As stated in the
extensive agreement, the three nations commit to "improve working conditions and
living standards in each Party's territory." See NAALC, at 2.
47. Kristi Schaeffer, Mercosur and Labor Rights: The Comparative Strengths of
Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in Developing and Enforcing Labor Standards in
Latin American States, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 853 (2007).
48. Ruth Buchanan & Rusby Chaparro, International Institutions and
Transnational Advocacy: The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 135, 137 (2008); Frank H.
Bieszczat, Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements: From the NAALC to Now, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1387, 1406 (2008).
49. Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 49, at 129, 135, 137.
50. Knox, supra note 24, at 377.
51. Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 49, at 139.
52. Knox, supra note 24, at 386.
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Rights Watch, the side agreements signatories have worked
together to minimize the effectiveness of the agreement. 3 Due to
the structure of the labor side agreement, wherein soft and hard
law administered by biased governmental officials is expected to
overpower the incentive of greater taxes and corporate profits, the
agreement has expectedly proven ineffective. Thus, the ineffective
side agreement on labor has generated little incentive for Mexico
to improve or enforce its labor laws, and has been unable to pre-
vent a race to the bottom.
Representative of this failure is the agreement's enforcement
history. During the twelve years following the agreement's pas-
sage, roughly thirty-four complaints were filed, of which, a major-
ity were dismissed or withdrawn.54 Among the claims that were
not dismissed, none survived long enough to reach an arbitral tri-
bunal with enforcement powers.55 Beside its abysmal enforcement
history, many fundamental rights are unable to even reach the
enforcement phase of the agreement.56 Under the NAALC, if an
employee's right to organize or collectively bargain is violated, the
agreement cannot require an employer to rehire illegally fired
workers and is unable to impose damages against a government
that fails to enforce the worker's rights.57 This creates an environ-
ment where the employees have no leverage to bargain or organ-
ize and the government is incentivized to support corporate
interests that are contrary to the spirit of the agreement. In light
of these realities, critics of the mechanism have dubbed it "dead
letter," and it has garnered scholarly recognition for its lack of
effectiveness.5 "
The creation of a free-market system in the Americas allows
Mexico to abandon recognized rights for its labor sector and per-
mits the country to leverage one of its few comparative advan-
tages, an exploitable labor force.59 Mexico surely believed this was
53. Human Rights Watch, Future Trade Pacts Must Avoid Pitfalls (Apr. 15, 2001),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/04/15/nafta-labor-accord-ineffective.
54. Jacobs, supra note 41, at 136.
55. Id.
56. Laura Okin Pomeroy, The Labor Side Agreement Under the NAFTA: Analysis
of its Failure to Include Strong Enforcement Provisions and Recommendations for
Future Labor Agreements Negotiated with Developing Countries, 29 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 769, 792 (1996).
57. Id.
58. Knox, supra note 24, at 377.
59. Raidl Delgado Wise & James M. Cypher, The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor
under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integration, 610 ANNALs
AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 120, 138 (2007).
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a needed advantage under NAFTA and is why the labor agree-
ment accomplishes little.60 Without such low utility, there would
be less of an incentive for Mexico to sign NAFTA.61 As such, Mex-
ico's current labor scheme allows employers to establish economi-
cally beneficial and dismal working conditions. Those willing to
stand up to their employers are often faced with draconian conse-
quences.62 The brave willing to organize are fired and have perma-
nent difficulty finding another job.63 Workers who submit
complaints to labor oversight bodies quickly discover the futility of
their attempts. 4 As a result, they have little to no bargaining
power, and their employers, cognizant of the fact that there is no
mechanism to enforce labor abuses, are incentivized to take
advantage of Mexicans through economically advantageous and
inhumane working conditions.65 This was a foreseeable and
intended result of the NAALC, a result that aligned with the eco-
nomic interests of the sovereigns' corporations and thus the politi-
cal will. The same outcome arose out of the side agreement on the
environment.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
Just as the supplemental labor agreement panders to corpo-
rate interests, so does the supplemental environmental agree-
ment.66 The side agreement on the environment, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
was passed with the asserted purpose of preventing signatories of
NAFTA from lowering environmental standards in an effort to
attract business.6 There was voiced concern that if Mexico began
its anticipated race to the bottom America and Canada would fol-
60. Betty Southard Murphy, NAFTA's North American Agreement On Labor
Cooperation: The Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INTL L. 403, 417 (1995).
61. Isa, supra note 42, at 199.
62. See A. Maria Plumtree, Maquiladoras and Women Workers: The
Marginalization of Women in Mexico as a Means to Economic Development, 6 Sw. J.L.
& TRADE AMs. 177, 189 (1999).
63. Id.
64. As already indicated, this mechanism is inherently ineffective. See generally
DAVID BACON, CHILDREN OF NAFTA: LABOR WARs ON THE U.S.-MEXIco BORDER 76
(2004).
65. See infra Part II, which highlights the conditions workers are forced to endure
in order to create higher profits for companies.
66. Kevin Scott Prussia, NAFTA & the Alien Tort Claims Act: Making a Case for
Actionable Offenses Based on Environmental Harms and Injuries to the Public Health,
32 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 385 (2006).
67. Bradley N. Lewis, Biting Without Teeth: The Citizen Submission Process and
Environmental Protection, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2007).
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low suit in an effort to prevent businesses from relocating.' Many
environmental groups in America and Canada banded together to
create political opposition to the passage of NAFTA if it excluded
environmental constraints. 69 This political movement gained such
momentum that significant political pressure was placed on
American presidential candidates during the 1992 election.70 As a
result, President Clinton promised voters he would require envi-
ronmental constraints with the passage of NAFTA and kept his
promise once elected to office by mandating the drafting of the
NAAEC.7 1 However these regulations, as one scholar put it,
amounted to nothing more than a paper tiger.72 Much like the pas-
sage of the side agreement on labor, this political pandering
amounted to nothing more than a superficial way to appease his
constituency.
The eventual provisions in the NAAEC would create a mecha-
nism that was meant to prevent corporations from exploiting the
environment, but unfortunately, the mechanism designed to
accomplish this is inherently ineffective. There are three major
problems with the effectiveness of the side agreement. First, the
agreement only requires countries to enforce their current envi-
ronmental laws.73 Thus, a country can change its environmental
laws to allow corporations to abuse the environment and the
agreement is unable to prevent such legislative changes." If a pri-
vate citizen submits a claim under the agreement that Mexico has
rewritten its laws to allow immense environmental destruction,
the people responsible for the submission process must dismiss
the claim.75 This allows Mexico's legislature to pander to corporate
interests by ignoring environmental standards.76 Nevertheless,
despite this immense loophole, there has been no need for the
rewriting of Mexican laws. In addition to having existing environ-
mental laws that are inadequate by developed nations' standards,
68. Lauren A. Hopkins, Protecting Costa Rica's Osa Peninsula: CAFTA's Citizen
Submission Process and Beyond, 31 VT. L. REV. 381, 388 (2007).
69. Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American
Environmental Law after the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 395,
406-07 (2001).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Chris Dove, Can Voluntary Compliance Protect the Environment?: The North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 880
(2002).
73. Id. at 881.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 883.
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Mexico fails to mandate compliance with its substandard regula-
tory scheme.77 Thus, despite the side agreement's greatest failure,
Mexico has had no need to take advantage as the country allows
its environmental laws to decay through a lack of enforcement.78
The second way the environmental agreement fails to accom-
plish its purpose is through its submission and enforcement proce-
dures. Although any of the three countries' governments, citizens,
or corporations can submit a claim that a government has not fol-
lowed its environmental laws, the only way a violator can be pun-
ished with monetary damages is if one of the three governments
brings a claim.79 Moreover to impose damages, the other two sig-
natories must agree by vote to convene an arbitral panel vested
with punitive power.80 This design, again, is akin to the fox guard-
ing the hen house. Each country has an incentive to overlook one
another's environmental failings out of fear that reporting its
neighbors' abuses will eventually bring its own failings into the
spotlight.81 As one scholar aptly described the status quo, ".... the
three governments are not willing politically to treat the NAAEC
as a legally binding agreement, preferring instead to view it sim-
ply as an expression of aspirational principles." 2 The enforcement
history of the governmental submission process clearly supports
this view, as there has never been a submission by a governmen-
tal actor.8 The fact that such an avenue is the only one that allows
for damages, and has never been used, in and of itself, suggests
the NAAEC is dead letter and merely an "expression of aspira-
tional principles."84 Nevertheless, in addition to these two major
flaws, there is a third deficiency that makes the NAAEC inher-
ently ineffective.
Beyond the governmental submission mechanism, corpora-
tions and private citizens in any of the three countries are also
able to submit grievances. However, these submissions cannot
result in any substantive change to the practice that triggered the
submission. The only achievable outcome under such process is
77. Matthew L. Lopez, The Effects of Free Trade on the Environment: Conserving
the Environment while Maintaining Increased Levels of Economic Prosperity for
Developing Countries, 3 PHOENIX L. REv. 701, 710 (2010).
78. Id.
79. Kibel, supra note 70, at 414-16.
80. Id.
81. Dove, supra note 73, at 878.
82. Kibel, supra note 70, at 417.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 414-16.
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the publication of a record detailing what environmental failings
the citizen or corporation claims a government carried out.8"
Accordingly, minimal incentive exists for people to bring a claim if
they want to achieve substantive change. Moreover agents of the
governments are partly responsible for determining what issues
are reviewed under the current process, and over the years, have
worked to narrow the factual scope of submissions and treated the
process as adversarial." The governments' participation in the
system has thusly stymied the mechanism's overall effectiveness.
Governments faced with possible public criticism for failing to fol-
low their environmental laws under the agreement are afforded
the power to appoint those partly responsible for guaranteeing its
success, creating pressure on the governmental appointee to
reduce the effectiveness of the system." As a result, due to the
general design of the environmental side agreement, it is inher-
ently ineffective.
Even still, proponents of environmental rights under NAFTA
face even greater challenges than the inevitable failing of the
environmental side agreement. NAFTA not only overrides the side
agreement to protect corporate investment, but it also allows cor-
porations to override domestic laws and bring large claims against
governments who are not willing to allow corporations to abuse
their environment. This is due to corporations' ability under
NAFTA to sue a signatory when it passes environmental laws that
have a negative effect on a corporation's investment. 9 This poten-
tial creates situations where the government would rather settle a
case with a corporation and overturn an environmental regulation
than pay exorbitant damages to the corporation.
NAFTA overrides the side agreement as follows: if a business
builds a manufacturing plant that operates in a particular fashion
which is legal at the time of creation but deleterious to environ-
86. Id.
87. Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the
Power to Investigate Violations of Environmental Laws, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483, 495
(1994); Chris Wold, Lucus Ritchie, Deborah Scott & Matthew Clark, The Inadequacy
of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 418, 442
(2004).
88. Id.
89. William Greider, The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century,
THE NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 55.
90. Marina Medved, Potential Environmental Impacts of Central America Free
Trade Agreement-Dominican Republic, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 74, 96-99
(2006).
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mental health, a company can sue Mexico for subsequently pass-
ing environmental laws which affect the operation of the plant in
such a way that the company's return on investment decreases. 91
The company can submit its dispute to an arbitral tribunal that
creates a binding ruling on both the country and the corporation,
which may result in the government paying millions of dollars in
damages.92 This creates a perverse incentive structure.93 On the
one hand it creates a condition where companies have an incen-
tive to abuse the environment to realize greater returns on invest-
ment.94 By doing so, companies are able to create precedent
allowing them to sue the government when their returns are com-
promised due to increased environmental protections.9" On the
other hand, the government has a disincentive to act on environ-
mental ills because of such "pollution precedent."96 Moreover the
government is disincentivized to regulate because it could create
an economic discouragement to the building of factories in Mexico.
Overall, the system creates a legal relationship where corpora-
tions are encouraged to harm the environment in order to increase
their economic gains, while the government is incentivized to do
nothing.97
The designs of the environmental and labor agreements seem
to align with the overall corporate impetus behind free trade
agreements, the allowance of labor and environmental degrada-
tion to provide for greater profits. Certainly, with a thorough
understanding of the design and the inherent fatal flaws of these
agreements, the assertion that they were meant to do anything
other than allow for NAFTA's passage becomes understood as
incredible. That is, once the agreements are fully analyzed, their
ultimate purpose of allowing corporations unfettered discretion in
order to reap greater profits becomes manifest. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that once the race to the bottom is perpetuated,
it is generally accompanied by domestic changes that similarly
91. John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
429, 432 (2006).
92. Madeline Stone, NAFTA Article 1110: Environmental Friend or Foe?, 15 GEo.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 763, 764 (2003).
93. Francisco S. Nogales, The NAFTA Environmental Framework, Chapter 11
Investment Provisions, and the Environment, 8 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 134
(2002).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See generally Michael A. Fallek, Trouble on the U.S.-Mexico Border: The
Mysterious Anencephaly Outbreak, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 288 (1996).
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facilitate corporate pillaging and must be similarly understood to
combat abuses.
PART II: COMBINED EFFECT OF NAFTA AND SIDE
AGREEMENTS WITH MEXICAN DOMESTIC POLICY,
THE RESULTING EXPLOITABLE POPULACE
Free trade agreements are not the only way countries facili-
tate the abuses of their citizens by multi-national corporations.
Domestic policy is often changed in an effort to facilitate the race
to the bottom, and Mexico is no exception. 98 To fully understand
the present human rights problem in Mexico as well as in other
countries that sign free trade agreements, in addition to under-
standing the effect of NAFTA and its side agreements, one must
also take notice of frequent changes to domestic policy that aid the
transformative effects of free trade.9 Mexico provides a good case
study for such an understanding.
Around the time of NAFTA's passage, Mexico was poised to
develop a new free trade model. 100 But to do this, it decided certain
impediments had to be lifted in order to create an unhindered
shift to free trade in North America." 1 Under free trade in North
American, Mexico knew its comparative advantage would be
cheap labor due to its anticipated lax workplace standards and a
large lower class. Not only did it want to leverage this labor force,
but anything it could do to shift the movement of lower class Mexi-
cans towards corporate demand would necessarily aid its envi-
sioned transformation.0 2 As such, it went about taking a series of
steps that allowed corporations to exploit Mexico's lower class. 10 3
Its first step was to change the Mexican constitution.' Such
change in conjunction with a second step, the removal of corn sub-
sidies, pushed lower class Mexicans off their lands and towards
corporations willing to exploit Mexico's labor force. 0 5
98. Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An "Empire of Law"
or the "Law of Empire"?, 60 ALA. L. REV. 943, 961 (2009).
99. Id.
100. Jorge I. Euan-Avila, Manuel Chavez & Scott Whiteford, The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Mayan Indigenous People of the Yukitan,
Peninsula FTA's within the Hemisphere and their Environmental and Investment
Chapters: Impact on Indigenous People, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 291, 298 (2006).
101. Id.
102. See generally David Yetman, Ejidos, Land Sales, and Free Trade in Northwest
Mexico: Will Globalization Affect the Commons?, 41 Am. STuD. 211 (2000).
103. Id.
104. Euan-Avila, Chavez & Whiteford, supra note 101, at 298.
105. See Rick Relinger, NAFTA and U.S. Corn Subsidies: Explaining the
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For around seventy-five years, the Mexican constitution
firmly established a land ownership system that allowed lower
class Mexicans to live on, cultivate, and manage certain small to
medium plots of land. °6 Mexicans lived on these lands and agri-
culturally developed much of the plots.' The sale or rental of this
land had been prohibited under the constitution until 1992, when
in preparation for NAFTA, the government changed the Mexican
constitution.0 8 In addition to allowing the lower class to sell their
holdings, the government increased the landowners' holdings
requirement. 9 For certain categories of land, the holdings
requirement increased by roughly two hundred percent."0 These
new changes were the beginnings of a governmentally incen-
tivized migration of lower class Mexicans towards corporate
demand."' The next step was to lift corn subsidies.
By increasing land holding requirements and allowing poor
farmers to legally sell their lands, the Mexican government set the
stage for a lower class migration due to the expected influx of
cheap American food under free trade."2 America would not stop
subsidizing a large part of their agricultural industry, including
its multi-billion dollar corn industry.13 As a result, because fifteen
million Mexican farmers depended on the production of corn as a
livelihood, a large percentage of Mexicans would be out of work
and pushed off of their now sellable lands."' Thus, the altering of
Displacement of Mexico's Corn Farmers, PROSPECT J. INT'L AFF. AT UCSD (Apr. 2010),
http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu / index.php /2010 / 04 / nafta-and-u-s-corn-subsidies-
explaining-the-displacement-of-mexicos-corn-farmers/.
106. Euan-Avila, Chavez & Whiteford, supra note 101, at 298.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. A holding requirement in the context of land ownership is the amount of land
one needs to hold in order to legally retain a property that falls within a particular
governmental definition. For instance, if there is a five-acre holding requirement in
Coral Gables, Florida one could not own land unless they owned five acres. This
subjects such areas to forced migration by those not capable of meeting the
governmentally imposed holding requirement. Specifically, those who are too poor to
meet the holdings requirement are required to sell their lands. This is particularly
troubling when considering the lack of bargaining power such an environment
creates. Because they are required to sell their lands, predatory pricing resulting from
buyer collusion leads to deflated prices being offered to poor land owners. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Yetman, supra note 103.
112. Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican Migrants, 5 J.L. ECON. &
POL'Y 87, 98-99 (2009).
113. Id.
114. Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Corn Subsidies Said to Damage Mexico, N.Y. TiMEs
(Aug. 27, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/27/business/us-corn-subsidies-said-
to-damage-mexico.html.
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land ownership and holding requirements coupled with the
expected flood of cheap agricultural products purposefully
resulted in lower class Mexicans being forced off their lands and to
look for new jobs.115 Unfortunately, the millions of people govern-
mentally pushed into this economic model discovered that their
working conditions were abysmal, because as they eventually
learned, their human rights were afforded little protection." 6 This
is the reality of the race to the bottom under free trade and a gov-
ernmentally created aspect that is often overlooked.
Free trade in the Americas supported by a governmentally
incentivized migration of Mexican workers has resulted in a per-
fect storm of sorts. Mexico has ignored its labor and environmen-
tal laws, and as a result, corporations have taken advantage of a
large exploitable populace. This has foreseeably resulted in abhor-
rent working conditions in foreign owned Mexican factories and
created environmental problems that plague the areas in which
the intense pollution from the factories are emitted. Sorrowingly,
all of this was expected; it is the foreseeable outcome when corpo-
rations are gifted unfettered discretion as to the extent they wish
to respect human rights and environmental standards.
Economic and Working Conditions in Foreign Owned
Factories, a Forced Exodus into an Abhorrent Reality
The combination of the variables described above resulted in
a mass exodus from the farmland to both foreign owned factories
in Mexico and illegal employment in the United States. 17 Accord-
ing to one study, illegal immigration into the United States has
increased over the last twelve years by sixty-six percent. 8 And
from just 1987 to 1997, the number of Mexicans working in foreign
owned factories increased from three hundred thirty thousand
employed in 1,120 factories to around a million working in around
3,700 factories. 9 Unfortunately, the jobs found by lower class
115. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Deconstructing the Mythology of Free Trade: Critical
Reflections on Comparative Advantage, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 65, 84-86 (2006).
116. See infra Part II.
117. Louis Uchitelle, NAFTA Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2OO7/O2/18/weekinreview/18
uchitelle.html.
118. Dr. William Gibson, Winners and Losers: The Cost and Effects of Agriculture
Subsidies and Dumping on the United States and Mexico, http://www.tjadventures
.com/powerpoints/PolSci-Powerpointl.ppt.
119. Anne-Marie O'Conner, Sam Dillon & Sidney Weintraub, Mexico: Wages,
Maquiladoras, NAFTA, MIGRATION NEWS (Vol. 5 No. 2, 1998), http://migration.
ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1451_0 2_0.
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Mexicans in these factories garnered reputations as paying below
the poverty line, requiring employment under abhorrent working
conditions, and creating little chance for economic or social
advancement. 120 Employment was found in the Maquiladoras, a
term used to describe foreign owned factories predominantly
located on the border of the US and Mexico. 2' These factories have
garnered an extremely poor reputation in the Americas for their
conditions of employment.'22 But this was expected. It was the
foreseeable result of market capitalism in Mexico without govern-
mentally imposed conditions for workers' rights.22 The purpose of
having weak labor and environmental enforcement was to allow
for multi-national corporations to take advantage of lower class
Mexican workers.'24 And as a result of this created economic envi-
ronment, two questions necessarily arise. First, do the factories
reputations accurately depict reality within their walls? And sec-
ond, is there a solution to the negative effect unfettered capitalism
has had on human rights?
Maquiladoras and the Unprotected Rights of Workers
Ultimately, the poor reputation of Maquiladoras is as accu-
rate as it is unfortunate. As one empirical study noted, these men
and women face serious health effects, which the workers assert
are due to their employment with the Maquiladoras . 21 Reportedly,
there is a significant percentage increase in health problems
among Maquiladora workers, the most common complaint in one
empirical study being respiratory problems.2 ' As another empiri-
cal study notes, the factories are much like 19th century sweat-
shops. 27 Often workers are forced to carry out repetitive tasks in
abusive working conditions. 2 For example, the workers' necks
120. See infra Part II.
121. Nicole L. Grimm, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and
its Effects on Women Working in Mexican Maquiladoras, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 184
(1998).
122. Id.
123. Jeff Faux, Without Consent: Global Capital Mobility and Democracy, DISSENT,
Winter 2004, at 48.
124. Id.
125. Kurt Alan Ver Beek, Maquiladoras: Exploitation or Emancipation? An
Overview of the Situation of Maquiladora Workers in Honduras, in 29 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1553, 1560-61 (0. Coomes ed., 2001).
126. Id. at 1560.
127. See generally Rafael Moure-Eraso et al., Back to the Future: Sweatshop
Conditions on the Mexico-U.S. Border. Ii. Occupational Health Impact of Maquiladora
Industrial Activity, 31 AM. J. INDus. MED. 587 (1997).
128. Id.
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and wrists are frequently injured due to the "repetitive movement
and forceful manual work."129 Many workers experience "fatigue,
chest pressure, and pins-and-needles sensations in [] [their]
extremities" due to exposure to chemicals and solvents.13 °
Although Mexican laws are in place to combat such abuses and
harmful work environments, they are rarely enforced and thusly
allow multi-national corporations to carry out human rights viola-
tions under inhumane working conditions.
The effect on workers with medical conditions is equally pro-
nounced. A study by the Mexican Institute of Public Health indi-
cated that women working in Maquiladoras are more likely to
have problems associated with giving birth due to the "arduous
working conditions and lack of [] [maternity] leave ... ."131 Some
pregnant women are forced to continue working while late into
their pregnancies because they were not permitted to take leave
or because leave was permitted but unpaid." ' In light of the reali-
ties associated with making no money for an extended period,
some women have chosen to continue working, and had miscar-
riages as a result.13 3 But others are also adversely affected. If a
worker who is injured at a factory takes a day off to receive medi-
cal attention, the manager sometimes forces the individual to
work a number of days without pay as punishment, or in the alter-
native, terminates their employment." This like other violations,
occurs without legitimate legal recourse under the law.1 35 As one
worker put it: the problem is not the law; the problem is enforce-
ment. 36 Sadly, such lax enforcement also adversely affects chil-
dren's rights.37
Because many parents are unable to support a family with
their meager Maquiladora salary, their children sometimes join
them in the factories. 3 ' As a consequence, children laboring in the
129. Id. at 592-93.
130. Id. at 591.
131. Prudencia Cer6n-Mireles, Siobdn D. Harlow & Constanza I. Sdnchez-Carrillo,
The Risk of Prematurity and Small-for-Gestational-Age Birth in Mexico City: The
Effects of Working Conditions and Antenatal Leave, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 825, 827
(1996).
132. Id. at 829.
133. Id.
134. BACON, supra note 65, at 62.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 76.
137. Id. at 39.
138. Id. at 35.
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Maquiladoras have become commonplace.'39 One source in the
Mexican government stated that roughly 800,000 children under
the age of fourteen are employed in Mexico. 140 Some of these chil-
dren reportedly work fifteen-hour days.14' Although Mexican law
makes child labor illegal, the reality is that the law is rarely
enforced and children are sometimes employed in the horrible con-
ditions of Maquiladora factories."4 As one scholar notes, "Maqui-
ladoras lay waste to entire communities, both the people and the
environment."43
As a result of this truth, due to the Maquiladoras' adverse
effect on the environment, living nearby possess a significant risk
to workers.'1 As previously discussed, the combination of Mexico's
lax environmental protections and the ineffectiveness of NAFTA's
parallel environmental agreement allow companies to carry out
activities that are very harmful to the Mexican environment.'
The effect of this pollution is significant for the workers employed
in Maquiladoras, as many live near the facilities.'46 As one critic
noted, the hazardous waste of much of these factories is "simply
washed down the drain" and each "year[] seven million tons of
toxic waste are, without controls, illegally dumped in drains and
marine waters. Only 1 percent [of factories] are [monitored]
... ," As a result, the towns in which the Maquiladoras are
located, as one scholar highlighted, are "virtual cesspool and
breeding ground for [ ] disease." In some communities, "the pollu-
tion is visible to the naked eye-orange and purple slime pours
out of discharge pipes and flows down open canals ... ."148 And the
rate of "communicable and infectious diseases are significantly
139. Joshua M. Kagan, Workers' Rights in the Mexican Maqulidora Sector:
Collective Bargaining, Women's Rights, and General Human Rights: Law, Norms, and
Practice, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 165 (2005).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. BACON, supra note 65, at 39.
143. Id. at 49.
144. Sara E. Grineski & Timothy W. Collins, Exploring Patterns of Environmental
Injustice in the Global South: Maquiladoras in Cuidad Judrez, Mexico, 29
POPULATION & ENV'T 247, 253 (2008).
145. Id.
146. Grimm, supra note 122, at 277.
147. C. Gerald Fraser, NAFTA's Environmental Problems, EARTH TIMES, Jan. 22,
1996, at 4.
148. Kevin Scott Prussia, NAFTA & the Alien Tort Claims Act: Making a Case for
Actionable Offenses Based on Environmental Harms and Injuries to the Public Health,
32 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 400-01 (2006).
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higher."141 Indeed, exposure to these environmental harms may
cause cancer and birth defects within the Maquiladora communi-
ties.150 One study indicated that the Mexican pollution may be
increasing the rate of babies born "with incomplete or missing
brains and/or skulls."15' Thus, the Maquiladoras not only create
abysmal working conditions, they pollute the towns in which the
workers live.
Unfortunate as it may be, these are but a few of the human
rights issues raised by the Maquiladoras. They are the offspring of
free trade and inadequate protections of human rights and an
example of the true human cost associated with allowing corpora-
tions and governments to collaboratively create a race to the bot-
tom. No doubt this occurs because of the international competition
under the race to the bottom, a global race that perpetuates con-
cern that if Mexico protected human rights, Maquiladora jobs will
move to China or into another free trade zone in which corpora-
tions can abuse their workers. Almost certainly because of this,
the Mexican government sits idly by as corporations abuse its pop-
ulace. They sit idly by for the very reason finding a solution to
such abuses is extremely difficult, because it must not create fear
that jobs will disappear. Thus, the question necessarily arises: is
there a solution for the victims of unrestrained capitalism, one
that could possibly apply equally to all countries? An answer, and
partial solution, may lie in the Alien Tort Statute.
PART III: A SOLUTION?
Introduction: The Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) can be viewed not only as a par-
tial solution to human rights violations in the Maquiladoras, but
in factories around the globe. 52 The statute asserts that "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."5 3 It grants subject matter jurisdic-
149. Id. at 401.
150. Id.
151. Roderick R. Williams, Cardboard to Concrete: Reconstructing the Texas
Colonias Threshold, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 705, 711 (2002).
152. See Jill C. Maguire, Rape Under the Alien Tort Statute in the Post-Sosa v.
Alverez-Machain Era, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 935 (2005) ("The ATS allows aliens to
bring a claim for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty
before a federal district court.").
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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tion to U.S. federal courts to hear torts brought by an alien.' The
tort, however, must fit into a discrete class of torts the substance
of which lower courts are in disagreement over. 5' Importantly, a
small number of these torts recognized by lower courts, such as
the encouragement and employment of child labor, may result in
certain human rights abuses in the Maquiladoras becoming a cog-
nizable cause of action against US corporations.'56 Moreover it
would be applicable equally to all aliens, regardless of their coun-
try of origin, and therefore not create a fear that enforcing the
claims would result in the movement of factories out of Mexico. It
is therefore a solution that does not make Mexico a less attractive
country to exploit by multi-national corporations and is thus a
particularly attractive solution to a problem partially caused by
the pressure of the race to the bottom.
Nevertheless, no problem of such magnitude is solved with
ease, and the ATS is no exception. The statute is riddled with con-
flicting lower court rulings regarding both procedural questions as
well as questions regarding which torts create causes of action.
Thus although it is an especially apt solution to fix the human
rights violations in the Maquiladoras, understanding its potential
applicability to Maquiladora workers is as difficult as it is impor-
tant. This is an especially needed task in light of current incorrect
and outdated scholarship on the subject, which is no doubt due to
both the statute's difficulty and the changing landscape of the
ATS.
Current ATS Scholarship
There are a number of incorrect and outdated assertions in
current scholarship regarding the potential for Maquiladora work-
ers to bring a claim under the Alien Tort Statute. Indeed, not only
does the lone law review article to broach the issue never discuss
the doctrine of forum non conveniens (no doubt self-servingly due
to the doctrine's difficulty when applied to the ATS) but its excuse
for such omission is hidden in the 139th footnote. 7 Explaining
154. John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad:
The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (2009).
155. Ryan Lincoln, The Alien Tort Statute: Comments on Current Issues, 28
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 604, 607 (2010).
156. Vanessa R. Waldref, The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa: A Viable Tool in the
Campaign to End Child Labor?, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 160, 190 (2010).
157. See generally Grace C. Spencer, Her Body is a Battle Field: The Applicability of
the Alien Tort Statute to Corporate Human Rights Abuses in Juarez, Mexico, 40 GONZ.
L. REV. 503 (2004-05).
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why it did not address the doctrine, it asserts that "[slince this
discussion deals exclusively with American based companies, I
choose to not address this very real pitfall [forum non conveniens
is] for plaintiffs in ATS litigation."' But this assertion that forum
non conveniens is any less devastating to ATS claims when
brought against a US corporation is wholly false."5 9 Indeed,
numerous companies in the United States have successfully filed
forum non conveniens motions against alien plaintiffs.6 ° Thus,
current scholarship has incorrectly analyzed the procedural chal-
lenges to the ATS landscape.
But in addition to being incorrect, it is also outdated for two
main reasons. First, the article asserts, "it is likely the Maqui-
ladora workers would have to show that the American corpora-
tions are state actors in order to successfully invoke the ATS."' 6
Under current case law, this assertion is false. 162 Second, without
the advantage of six years of case law after the only Supreme
Court decision addressing the ATS, the article asserts that "it [is]
more than likely that the Maquiladora workers would not prevail
in an ATS claim brought under a law of nations theory."'63 This is
also false.16 As a result, because of the inaccurate and outdated
nature of current scholarship, a new map is needed to ascertain
the true landscape of the ATS. A map that can hopefully provide a
solution to human rights violations not only within the Maqui-
ladoras, but around the globe.
A Framework: Sosa Analyzed
The legal maneuvering one must undertake to successfully
bring an ATS claim is highly complex due to conflicting lower
court holdings attempting to interpret the only Supreme Court
case analyzing the ATS. Thus, to fully understand why the courts
have come to such varying conclusions and to learn how to bring a
valid claim despite the complex landscape, one must first analyze
the only Supreme Court case that federal courts must use to inter-
158. Id.
159. Undoubtedly the falsity of this statement was the reason the assertion lacked
a supporting footnote.
160. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights under the Alien
Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335 (1997).
161. Spencer, supra note 158, at 526.
162. See supra Part "Lower Courts Interpretation of Sosa."
163. Spencer, supra note 158, at 527.
164. See infra Part III.
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pret ATS claims: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machai.165
In Sosa, the US government paid Mexican nationals to forci-
bly bring a Mexican citizen to the US who was suspected of
involvement with the torture and killing of a DEA agent. 6 ' Forci-
bly removed from his home and made to stay in a hotel overnight,
he was eventually flown to the US on a private plane where he
was arrested.1 67 He would be acquitted of all charges, and upon
returning to Mexico sued the US under the ATS for his unlawful
detention.' 6 The Ninth Circuit recognized his right to sue under
the statute and ruled in his favor, but the Supreme Court reversed
the decision and ordered the case be dismissed. 69 The Court held
that only violations of accepted international law can be brought
under the statute and that Sosa's claim was not among these
accepted violations. 170
Sosa, our provided judicial road map on ATS claims, gives lit-
tle guidance as to the exact route one needs to take for a court to
hold that a plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute.' 71 The
starting point being a tort, and the ending point being which of
those torts is considered violative of a norm of international law.'72
This route was purposeful left open to allow for the development of
a federal common law governing claims in the area.173 In doing so,
the Court took two important steps in an attempt to simultane-
ously open and limit the potentially vast scope of the federal com-
mon law.
The Court's first step was to assert, "the door is still ajar...
and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today." 74
Thus, the Court recognized that the types of claims cognizable
under the statute were not limited to the causes of action availa-
165. 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Regina Waugh, Exhaustion of Remedies and the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 555, 557 (2010).
166. Elliot C. Cook, Internationalizing Copyright: How Claims of International,
Extraterritorial Copyright Infringement May Be Brought in U.S. Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 429, 435 (2007).
167. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 738.
171. Anthony Bernard, Holding Corporations Liable in the United States for Aiding
and Abetting Human Rights Violations Abroad: A Statutory Solution, 78 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 615, 625 (2010).
172. Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the
U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 273, 286 (2005).
173. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
174. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-30 (2004).
466
ACHILLES' HEEL
ble at the time of the statute's passage. 175 As a result more than
just "offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and
piracy" are allowed as a private cause of action.176 Thus, the Court
gave lower courts the privilege of defining new causes of action
that they deem to arise out of the framework provided by Sosa.
The Court's second step was to caution lower courts against
frivolously recognizing new causes of action.177 Indeed, although
the Court noted that the door was still open to recognition of
newly created causes of action, it asserted that any new causes of
action should be subject to "vigilant door keeping."7 ' The Court
attempted to supply throughout the opinion the type of vigilance it
expected from the lower courts, asserting that the "common law
[at the time of the ATS's passage] would provide a cause of action
for [only a] [I modest number of international law violations,
and that "... there are good reasons for a restrained conception of
the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new
cause of action of this kind."8" However, beyond brief interjections
suggestive of the cautious approach Federal courts should take in
creating new rights, the Court left open what "vigilant door keep-
ing" actually meant.' Just as the Court would leave their cau-
tionary advice open ended, it would do the same for the definition
of what constitutes a cause of action under the statute.
The Court provided a loose framework to lower courts to use
in determining if a tort constitutes a cause of action under the
ATS. '82 This would be based on what the court called, accepted
norms of international law.8 3 Torts that violate certain recognized
norms, the court held, become a recognized cause of action under
the statute. 8 4 The court would only provide two endpoints to help
lower courts decide if a tort amounts to a cause of action. On one
endpoint the Court expressed that the confinement the doctor was
forced to endure did not amount to an actionable claim because it
did not violate any accepted principles of international law. 8 5
175. Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
176. Id.
177. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 724.
180. Id. at 725.
181. Jill C. Maguire, Rape Under the Alien Tort Statute in the Post-Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain Era, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 935, 943-44 (2005).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738.
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However the court couched the plaintiffs claim in very broad
terms, stating that he "invokes a general prohibition of "arbitrary"
detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding positive
authorization to detain . . . regardless of the circumstances."" 6 As
a result, this endpoint provides little help due to its broad nature.
The court would subsequently attempt to define the other
endpoint of the law, the point at which a claim would be consid-
ered valid.
The point at which an alien can bring a valid claim under the
ATS, the Court asserted, required that the claimed "international
law norm [ I [have no] less definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when
§ 1350 was enacted."187 The Court went on to endorse as valid and
falling under this paradigm those acts which made a person an
"enemy of all mankind" such as torture and the slave trade, and
that any such claim must be a violation of an accepted principle of
international law that is "specific, universal, and obligatory."188
The Court continued, asserting that ". . . where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had [in order to determine what is and is not an
accepted principle of international law] to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators."'89 This, and this alone, would be the
bare bones framework the Court gifted lower courts attempting to
interpret the ATS.
Because this framework is more akin to guiding principles
than a strict set of rules, lower courts have interpreted the opinion
in various ways, some of which are in conflict. 9 ' As a result, lower
courts analysis of the area must be used to determine the viability
of a claim brought under the statute. The most dispositive ques-
tion when analyzing these decisions, as well as the most difficult
to answer, is whether violations seen in the Maquiladoras are
among the accepted international norms that allow for a viable
claim. However, before even reaching a point where one could
couch human rights failings as violations of accepted international
law, there are three major legal impediments to ATS claims.
186. Id. at 737.
187. Id. at 733.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 734.
190. See supra Part "Legal Impediments to ATS Claims."
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Legal Impediments to ATS Claims
The first problem that arises when attempting to bring an
ATS claim is whether a court will recognize corporate liability
under the statute. There is a conflict amongst the courts as to
whether a corporation can be held liable under the ATS."'
Recently, the Second Circuit decided that corporations cannot be
held liable for tort violations under the ATS. Moreover, a district
court in California has also asserted that the ATS does not extend
liability to corporations.193 However as the California Court noted,
"With a single exception . . . [courts have] uniformly rejected or
ignored" the claim that corporations cannot be held liable under
the ATS.19' Indeed most courts have held that a corporation can be
held liable under the ATS."9' Thus a Mexican worker bringing a
claim against a US corporation must be careful to file the com-
plaint in a jurisdiction that recognizes corporate liability under
the ATS.
The second issue the litigant might face is whether he or she
must exhaust local remedies before bringing a claim. 96 The Ninth
Circuit recently held that as matter of prudence, lower courts
could require exhaustion of local remedies when an ATS claim has
a weak nexus with the United States. 197 In such instances, the
court held that it was within the lower court's discretion to decide
that a claimant should exhaust all local remedies before bringing
an ATS claim.' 9 Nevertheless, district and circuit courts outside
the Ninth Circuit generally hold that exhaustion is not required
for ATS claims unless another statute used in conjunction with
the ATS requires it." Moreover, even in those instances where
courts did require exhaustion, the requirement was generally
irrelevant. As one scholar noted, ". . . [the] exhaustion require-
ment in the ATS may be a moot point.., most [of the] ATS cases
would not be dismissed for failure to exhaust."00 As a result, the
Mexican litigant would have to be cognizant of its potentially
191. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98991, at *191-92 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
2010).
192. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010).
193. Doe, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98991, at *191-92.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Waugh, supra note 166, at 565.
197. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824-25 (9th Cir. Cal. 2008).
198. Id.
199. Waugh, supra note 166, at 570. Up till 2008, almost no court outside the Ninth
Circuit required exhaustion when dealing solely with the Alien Tort Statute.
200. Id.
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weak nexus with the United States and not file a claim in the
Ninth Circuit if such nexus is questionable. Thus the exhaustion
requirement would likely not act as a bar to ATS claims. °1 But
this is not the last of the procedural hurdles the litigant would
likely face. The third, and possibly most formidable hurdle that
the claimant must address, is the potential for forum non con-
veniens to prevent the claim from staying in a US court.2"2 A brief
overview of the doctrine is warranted before analyzing its threat
to the ATS.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows for defendants to
request that a lawsuit be moved to a different forum that also pos-
sesses jurisdiction over the case.20 3 When faced with such a
motion, a federal court must first make sure the proposed alter-
nate forum possesses jurisdiction over all parties.2 4 It must subse-
quently weigh the private interests associated with adjudicating
the claim in each proposed forum with a strong presumption in
favor of plaintiffs preference.05 If private interests in another
forum are stronger despite such presumption, the case will be dis-
missed or transferred to allow such jurisdiction to hear the plain-
tiffs claim.20 6 However, if the court finds that the private interests
are roughly equal, it will then look to public interest factors to
determine whether the case should be moved to a different
forum.2 7 With respect to ATS claims, the threat of dismissal in a
US court due to a forum non conveniens motion is not to be taken
lightly. 08 As one scholar recently noted, "The forum non con-
veniens doctrine is an attractive tool to use against plaintiffs in
the ATS context."2 9 In the past five years a number of courts have
dismissed ATS claims due to the use of the forum non conveniens
doctrine.21 ° Plaintiffs bringing a claim under the ATS are espe-
cially susceptible to this attack, as evidenced by recent dismissals,
because they frequently are litigating issues that occurred in a
201. Id.
202. Rosaleen T. O'Gara, Procedural Dismissals under the Alien Tort Statute, 52
ARiz. L. REv. 797, 804 (2010).
203. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981).
204. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.
2009).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. O'Gara, supra note 204, at 804.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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foreign forum and are not US citizens. 211 This foreign element of
the case lends itself to dismissal under the test.
2 12
There are nevertheless two glimmers of light in this seem-
ingly bleak outlook for ATS claimants. First, the application of the
doctrine is factually intensive.1 3 This allows plaintiffs to diminish
the power of stare decisis by attempting to factually distinguish
their claims from those that were previously dismissed.214 This is
especially relevant in light of the fact that there is a severe
absence of ATS litigation from Mexican Maquiladora workers.1 5
As a result, if chartered correctly, by factually distinguishing their
case from precedent and avoiding inhospitable circuits, a claim
would have a significant chance at surviving an attack from the
forum non conveniens doctrine. 21 As stated by one commentator,
"courts [I applying the forum non conveniens doctrine [] have
placed tight restrictions on its application, deferring to a plaintiffs
choice of forum wherever possible."2 7 In fact at least one court has
construed the public factors of the forum non conveniens test more
heavily to allow an ATS claim to advance. 21' Thus, this legal hur-
dle is equally surpassable, albeit more difficultly, than other judi-
cial impediments created by courts.
Lower Courts' Interpretation of Sosa
Such legal obstacles, discouragingly enough, are insignificant
compared to the difficulty associated with determining whether a
human rights violation in the Maquiladora would be considered a
violation of an accepted norm of international law. This is because
there is little in the way of Supreme Court case law to determine
whether a tort amounts to such definition. But however nebulous
this legal landscape may be, a good starting place is the Restate-
ment of the Law of Foreign Relations.1 9 Section 702 reads that
211. Id.
212. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2001).
213. John S. Willems, Shutting the U.S. Courthouse Door? Forum Non Conveniens
in International Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2003, at 57, available at http:l!
www.whitecase.com/publications/detail.aspx?publication=509
214. Greg Vanden-Eykel, Case Comment, Convenience for Whom? When Does
Appellate Discretion Supercede a Plaintiffs Choice of Forum?-Aldana v. Del Monte
Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADV. 307, 311 (2010).
215. A search for cases using the query, "alien tort statute & summary (mexican or
mexico)," only brings up Sosa v. Alvarez-Machai.
216. Vanden-Eykel, supra note 216, at 311.
217. Id. at 310.
218. O'Gara, supra note 204, at 806.
219. Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of Alien Tort
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one can violate an international law if they "encourage[ I] or con-
done[ ] genocide; slavery or the slave trade . . . inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment.., or a consistent pattern of
gross violation of internationally recognized human rights."22 °
This provides an optimistic glimpse into the types of existent
international norms, but it only acts as a starting point. Analysis
of lower courts' interpretation of the Sosa president is required to
discover which of these norms is currently accepted by courts.
Lower courts deciding whether a claim falls under an
accepted international legal norm quote a passage from Sosa,
which states courts should only recognize those norms that are
"specific, universal, and obligatory," and that they should look to
"the works of jurists and commentators" to aid judicial determina-
tion of whether a claim amounts to such a violation.22' However, it
must be noted that the assertion claims need to be violative of uni-
versally accepted international law in order to be recognized does
not in fact mean they need to be truly universal. 22 Instead, "Virtu-
ally" all countries must accede to the validity of the principles
rather than all nations. 223 This is a particularly important point
for labor and human rights claims, as some nations lack recogni-
tion and protection for violations such as child labor, which in cer-
tain courts is a recognized claim under the ATS. 24 Indeed, at some
point the question of which claims are universal becomes a judg-
ment call regarding the nature of the law and the sovereigns who
recognize it. An example of this includes apartheid.225 As a result,
different circuits have interpreted causes of action under accepted
international law in conflicting manners.2 6 This is very important
with respect to corporate violations of human rights claims, which
Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction over Alien's Action for
Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116
A.L.R. FED. 387 (1993).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Raechel Anglin, Note, International Environmental Law Gets Its Sea Legs:
Hazardous Waste Dumping Claims Under the ATCA, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 231,
264 n.84 (2007).
223. Id.
224. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
225. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
226. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009)
(corporations can be held liable under the statute); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010) (corporations cannot be held liable); Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108068 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2010)
(finding no cause of action for child labor); Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1022
(finding a cause of action for child labor).
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just like other aspects of aspects of the ATS, may turn out differ-
ently depending on the court in which the claim is brought."'
The fact that courts are vested with the power to look at
scholarly works and non-binding treaties to determine what is
specific, universal, and obligatory and therefore an accepted norm
of international law, necessarily makes it difficult for ruling
courts to draw bright lines.22 Because of this, just like other areas
of the ATS, the success of a claim often depends on alleging a stra-
tegically chosen set of facts.229
One bright area for Maquiladora workers that invokes this
concept was issued by a court in the Southern District of Indiana,
which held that certain types of child labor may violate a norm of
accepted international law.' In Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., the
Court was forced to muddle through various legal standards
regarding child labor with respect to what age and what sort of
workplace conditions at various ages violate a norm of interna-
tional law.23 1 The court looked to both international as well as US
domestic labor law, and determined that an employer who allowed
and allegedly encouraged children "six, seven, or ten years old" to
work at a US company's foreign factory may violate a norm of
accepted international law. 2 The court held that the corporate
encouragement and employment of children workers combined to
create a potentially cognizable claim under the ATS.233 Impor-
tantly, the court also hinted that severe violations involving chil-
dren older than the age of ten could also potentially create a
cognizable claim under the ATS.234
This is a significant development for Maquiladora workers.
There are many reported incidents of child labor within foreign
owned factories. 235 Therefore, it is a particularly attractive litiga-
tion strategy to attempt to broadly define what the court means by
encouraging youth to work in factories. One could interpret this
case to stand for the proposition that encouragement by creating
an environment where children are welcome to be hired for cer-
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Jennifer Bol, Using International Law to Fight Child Labor: A Case Study of
Guatemala and the Inter-American System, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1135, 1165-68
(1998).
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tain jobs, by paying particularly low wages to their parents, cre-
ates a cause of action under the ATS. On the other hand, this case
could be read narrowly, and the employer might need to explicitly
encourage the employment of young children in harsh labor condi-
tions. Either way, it creates a potential cause of action for child
labor violations in the Maquiladoras, an avenue free from the
threat and pressure of globalization.
Such a cause of action, however, is not the only one available.
In fact, there is a circuit split regarding a much more amorphous
category of tort that allows for greater latitude in pleading a cause
of action." 6 This is the category of cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment.237 The Northern District of California held in 2008 that
acts constituting this type of treatment are cognizable causes of
action under the ATS.235 They have ruled in the opposite direction
of the Eleventh Circuit, which held that such actions are not viola-
tive of norms of accepted international law. 239 The California court
held that Chevron Corporation may have violated this cruel, inhu-
mane or degrading standard when it paid the Nigerian govern-
ment to treat protesters in a physically harsh manner.20 Although
other courts have held this category of tort cognizable under the
statute, they had all done so before the Supreme Court decided
Sosa.241 Therefore, this decision in ATS jurisprudence, particularly
in light of the fact that the Eleventh Circuit decision was made
after Sosa, is extremely important precedent.242 This is especially
true in light of the other cognizable claims under the ATS. Besides
the relatively narrow category of child labor, other potential ATS
claims such as torture, slavery, and genocide are thankfully not
available to claimants working in the Maquiladoras. Thus, this
flexible category of cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment is the
best avenue for claimants working in the Maquiladoras.
Thus, it is possible people working in the Maquiladoras can
236. Compare Estate of Amergi v. Palestinian Auth., 611 F.3d 1350, 1361 (11th Cir.
2010) (finding no cause of action for cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment), with
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding a cause
of action for cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment).
237. Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
238. Id.
239. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir.
2009).
240. Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
241. Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Chiminya Tachiona v.
Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 363 (D. N.J. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995).
242. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2006).
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bring claims against United States corporations for human rights
violations carried out in their factories. This is an exciting truth.
By holding corporations liable for human rights violations perpet-
uated in their factories, they will be disincentivized from treating
workers inhumanely. Indeed as stated, the ATS is an especially
apt solution for the violations documented in the Maquiladoras
because it would be equally applicable to all abusive factories, not
just those Mexico. Thus, this protection would not fall prey to the
threat of other free trade countries and corresponding prospects of
losing employment to those that allow environmental and worker
abuses.
CONCLUSION
The conditions found in the factories on the border of the
United States and Mexico are a prime example of the wrongs mar-
ket capitalism can create when unrestrained by law meant to
inject the model with altruism and respect for human rights.
When corporations are unfettered by such constraints, they abuse
a country's workers and destroy its environment. Although this
suggests a broader problem related to the effects of unfettered
capitalism, simple global solutions are not practicable. Therefore,
if true change is sought, scholars must come up with creative solu-
tions to constrain the free rain and harm created by corporations.
Solutions such as the ATS must be sought out in an effort to inject
altruism into the model and curtail human abuses. Without such
effort, globalism will continue to trample on the human rights of
workers and unfettered corporations will continue to perpetuate
substandard working and environmental conditions. For now
though, the ATS is a viable solution, but others must be discov-
ered. Otherwise, the effects of free trade and unrestrained capital-
ism will continue to wreak havoc in nations around the world.
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